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Chapter 7
On Growth and Form of Narrative
Structures
Guido Ferraro
Abstract Narrative is firstly a formal organization, but it is a form that interprets the
events giving them meaning. Starting from a reinterpretation of the classical Mor-
phology of the Folktale by Vladimir Propp, we can now note how narrative form and
cultural meanings interact with each other. Thus, we remove the “formal” dimension
from its traditional segregation to a universe of insubstantial non-things, returning it
to the arena of human strategic action and social practices. We may conceive a story
as a route performed by a subject on a social and categorical map: so, a narrative
configuration is essentially a set of dynamic relations, lying between a procedural
and a systemic dimension. We find the basis of everything in the fundamental
Saussurean view that interrupts the ordinary separation between “things” and
“relations”: identity, meaning, and structure are the effects of systemic relations. In
this light, Claude Lévi-Strauss offers us the most elaborate picture of narrative
systems, where textual objects are seen as secondary outcomes of transformational
tensions: every text is by nature a remake; it exists only through other texts. The most
radical feature of this original perspective is indisputably the adoption of the theo-
retical model expounded by D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson in his famous book on
the morphogenesis of zoological species, On Growth and Form. Textual theory
emerges greatly innovated, linked to a view of cultures as systemic networks of
connected texts. And this applies also to products of our culture, as the concluding
examples (the Alien film saga and Puccini’s Bohème) should positively illustrate.
7.1 The Meaning of the Form
For some time, the idea that the narrative system has a central or even primary role
among other semiotic systems is widespread, not only in semiotics but also in
psychology and other areas of the humanities. Take, for example, the opening
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words of Hayden White’s famous book The Content of the Form, which is
undoubtedly relevant to our discussion: “To raise the question of the nature of
narrative is to invite reflection on the very nature of culture and, possibly, even on
the nature of humanity itself” (White 1987: 1). This primary and dominant position
—that could for the first time free language from the role of “primary modeling
system”—seems attributable to the fact that the narrative system offers us an image
of special abstraction, or of particular purity, where the form dominates what
represents the filling, i.e. the concrete elements of the story. The distinction in the
field of historiography between real history and simple chronicles is revealing.
“Form” is the manner, imbued with narrative, in which historians organize the data
provided by the material in the chronicles. This form gives meaning to events that,
by themselves, do not appear to have a narrative configuration. As White writes
(1987: 44), “any given set of real events can be emplotted in a number of ways, can
bear the weight of being told as any number of different kinds of stories”. So, “it is
the choice of the story type and its imposition upon the events that endow them with
meaning”. The narrative, in short, adds nothing to the content of the events that it
tells, but superimposes a formal organization, and since this form interprets the
events, it is crucial to their meaning. Let’s start from the idea that the form is
anything but a neutral instrument of meaning, and let’s discard from the very
beginning the hypothesis that sees the form that organizes a story as a mere
reproduction of the “form of the events” to which it alludes. Multiple hypotheses
are still available, which are very different from each other.
The book to which we refer most often, as the starting point of narrative theory,
holds the significant title of Morphology of the Folktale (Propp 1928). This work
primarily presents an “unitary composition scheme”, intended to describe the
general form of folktales from the Russian tradition. The scheme, despite being
constructed in a partially inductive manner (from one hundred textual samples), can
neither be described as a simple generalization nor as a real prototype. Since no
folktale presents the entire range of functions that make up the whole schema—
some, in fact, present very few, or select a conspicuously partial subset—you could
say on one hand that the composition scheme is, as such, missing direct textual
implementation, and on the other that each story is seen as an imperfect trace of the
model, as an incomplete and basically inessential occurrence. What matters are not
the projections of the model onto textual objects, but the semio-cultural configu-
ration as such: an higher-level entity, not directly observable, understandable only
in its whole finished design, and as such the primary carrier of semantic values. This
hypothesis is perhaps questionable, but intriguing.
The cultural value of this configuration was subsequently clarified by an analysis
of its historical roots (Propp 1946), which is founded in the fundamental ritual
practice of initiation ceremonies. This historical and cultural grounding, badly lost
in subsequent generalizations, should make us aware of the fact that the schema
matches one of the different existing narrative architectures. In any case, this
inaugural essay, permeated by the spirit of the formalist movement, has bequeathed
us with the idea that it is to some extent possible to isolate a purely formal level,
provided with relative autonomy.
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For its part, the subsequent Greimasian school, despite having insisted on the
concept of “immanence”, nevertheless allocated immanent nature only to the var-
iable textual content, and certainly not to the formal structures called to organize
them—regardless of whether we are referring to the “semiotic square” proposed to
structure the deep level or the “canonical schema” which sets up the surface nar-
rative structure. With respect to the first structure, we return to a logical dimension
found in the most extreme levels of generality and abstraction, trying even the
dubious move of an Aristotelian complicity. The second structure invokes the
interesting but imprecise concept of an analogy of life experience. Neither these,
nor other formal structures proposed in the course of the volcanic wave of Gre-
imasian innovations, are marked by historic value, and therefore meaning. In the
case of the semiotic square, the meaning comes from the elements called to fill the
slots, not from the logical form, conceived as unchanging and neutral. The same can
be said for the “canonical narrative schema”, which in spite of it’s limited starting
textual reference was immediately, carelessly generalized, taken on as an universal
model of narrative construction. The reference to the formal mechanism does not
imply, in this context, a choice, axiological implications, or semiotic functionality.
Regardless of whether they are logical structures or experiential patterns, they are
projected onto the text as if they were plummeting down from extra-semiotic
spaces. One may well ask at this point if other avenues are possible, theoretically
better developed and more suitable for insertion into current perspectives. As we
will see, in this sense important traces in the history of semiotics are identifiable.
One must, first of all, not think of “form” as a kind of statically defined mold or
matrix, located on an uneven plane compared with that of textual objects, and
therefore removed from the mechanisms of the “framework of social life”, which
Saussure tied to his original conception of semiotics. One must also remove the
“formal” dimension from its traditional segregation to a universe of non-things, as
impeccable as insubstantial, in order to return it to the arena of human action,
endowed with meaning and strategic direction, in the middle of “social practices”.
As we shall see, there are semiotic theories that move in this direction. However,
from the beginning we must remember the fundamental Saussurean concept that
interrupts the ordinary separation between “things” and “relations”. He claims that
the identity of things is definable in terms of a pure set of relationships, without
requiring full entities, or “positive terms” with which to engage for their institution.
But if we really want to understand in what sense it is possible to identify a formal
component, independent or otherwise, we need to clarify something regarding the
basic conditions of narrative.
7.2 The Essence of Narrative Form
The concept that narrative constructions are based on an elementary structure is
largely accepted. Gerald Prince (1982), who addressed this in more detail than
others, called it “minimal story”. It is composed of three segments: A. a departure
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state, B. a transformative event, C. an arrival state. Between the first and the second
segment there is a simple temporal succession, while between the second and third,
there is also a relationship of causal determination. Finally, the state of things C,
presented in closure, should not be thought of as independent, and must correspond
to a possible transformation of the departure state A. Let us add that this also
assures the hold of the thematic continuity. If, for example, the opening segment
thematizes the economic status of a character X, that we assume suffers from
poverty, the closure state should also address the relationship between X and an
economic state. In the C phase he could have become enormously rich, simply not
as poor, or have gotten even poorer. This, in any case, must appear as a result of the
way in which the event B has transformed the initial state A.
Of course, most stories are far more complex. But the first explanation for this is
that elementary structures of this type are simply joined in sequence, so that the
story presents itself as a set of segments, in which each segment is defined by one
entry and one exit configuration. Another interesting mechanism is one in which a
minimum story (described earlier) generates a series of expansions that can even
create a very long and complex construction. For example, the starting condition,
“X is poor”, can be expanded into a sub-narration that explains how X has been
impoverished, say, losing his possessions at poker. In a next step, the transformative
event “losing his possessions at poker” can be expanded into an episode with
greater detail, which shows how his dearest friend transformed him from a prudent
father into a reckless gambler. It can continue in this manner theoretically to
infinity. At each step, what was a single phase of a simpler structure gives rise to an
entire sequence. The mechanism is elementary, if you will, but offers us a way of
looking at text generation in a very different manner from the Greimasian “gen-
erative trajectory”, often criticized for its difficulty in explaining conversions
between levels that are too markedly heterogeneous. The generation of a story does
not start with an abstract logical structure, but from a basic narrative structure. In
addition, this perspective offers us a substantial isomorphism between the overall
shape of the story and the configuration of the segments that compose it. At all
levels, the main idea remains the same. A beginning condition is given, defined as
relational configuration between a number of elements. A transformative process,
changing the relationships between those elements, establishes the end condition.
The vicissitude that corresponds to the classical Propp-Greimas pattern shows, for
example, the transformation of a character’s identity, originally in a state of social
marginality, later achieving a status characterized by wealth and power.
The concept of a transformative event corresponds in substance to the Proppian
concept of “function”. Although the original definition was formulated in an
unsatisfactory manner, we can utilize the suggestion related to the use of a term
that, at least in Western languages, has a key role in both the mathematical and
computer theory. The latter is particularly interesting, in that in computer theory a
strictly defined procedure, which outputs the result of a transformation of the input
terms, is called a “function”. The analogy is therefore not superficial. For example,
when we speak of the function called ‘Attainment of the magical tool’, we refer to
an incident that leads to a condition defined in relation to the departure point—the
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protagonist must do something but lacks one or more essential tools—into a dif-
ferent output condition. In this case, the hero now has the tools needed to
accomplish the feat. With each function that happens in the story, the situation—
that is, the relationship between the elements at hand—changes in a certain way,
corresponding to the transformative nature of that particular function. Even if in the
various narratives the elements may be completely different, the function processes
this relational transformation following the same logic. Therefore from Propp’s
research we derive the idea that the transformative phases, central to any narrative
construction, do not require a local description, but correspond to a limited set of
procedures that are grammaticalized on a, in some way, global level. On top of this,
there is the fundamental concept that a narrative model (or “compositional scheme”,
in Proppian terminology) corresponds to an essentially fixed string of functions.
The elements that are introduced have little importance, since the meaning comes
mainly from the global design of this transformative mechanism.
From this basic theoretical model, it is possible to add at least two more elab-
orate, different but not mutually exclusive, notions. The first notion, which exam-
ines the relationship between the departure and arrival states, recognizes the
presence of a fundamental hierarchical relationship that definitely favors the second
state with respect to the first. Greimas’s definitions are the most well known in this
regard. He refers respectively to placed content and reversed content, but often this
view is not only connected to, but confused with Lévi-Strauss’ concept, from which
it was originally inspired. Both authors believe that the situation presented in the
final stages of the story is that which is positively supported and affirmed by the
text, and which is reversed in the initial situation. There are, however, decisive
differences. In Greimas’ version, everything is tied to the perspective of a subject
















Fig. 7.1 The grid represents
the invariable social system,
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that formulates a narrative program that will lead to the final condition, which is
initially placed in the dimension of desire and virtuality. In Lévi-Strauss’ case the
final state, on the contrary, far from being marked by virtuality, corresponds to the
state of things as we can observe them in the world around us, while what is projected
in the past tense (“mythical times”), therefore placed in the initial phase of the story,
is its hypothetical, virtual conceptual variation. The theoretical question—for
instance, around the value of the seasons or the meaning of funeral rituals—is
answered through the examination of an alternative condition: “And if the seasons did
not exist? And if funeral rites were not held?” In both cases, however, the beginning
and end no longer appear to us as simple poles of a linear sequence, but rather as
hierarchized constructs, dispersed on the timeline for fundamentally semantic rea-
sons. We can already say that the story, rather than “moving” syntagmatically from
one extreme to another, compares paradigmatically alternative conditions.
However, another direction that we can examine opens up, as stated earlier. The
narrative arc, which we superficially see as a bridge between the initial and final
state, establishes a polarity that separates, and somehow keeps the two conditions at
a distance. Obviously, since all of the elaborations of the basic formula are possible,
we can encounter every imaginable variation, including those of narrative texts in
which the final state is no different from the initial one. We know, however, that the
basic form tends to mark a clear difference (for example, the character that will
eventually be rich and powerful is poor and marginal at the beginning). In the
framework of the creation of an integrated semiotics1—what I call “neoclassical”
semiotics—this differential tension was linked to (quite spontaneous for those who
work in a Saussurean manner) the concept of difference as the primary root of
signification. It is quite logical to consider the narrative construction as a device that
manages the projection (stretched across the expositive dimension of the sequence)
of a semantic value, by its nature defined precisely in terms of a difference. The
typical narrative path, that runs from the disjunction from some object of value


























































Fig. 7.2 Here the individual route remains unchanged, but the subject decides to change the
coordinates defining the frame of reference he is using to read the reality. So, the value of the
opposite poles turns out to be reversed, in both couples concerning social status and authenticity.
Same route, but in an altered grid
1 Ferraro (2013): 183–192.
146 G. Ferraro
(taken as the initial condition), to the conjunction as a final condition, may well be
rethought of as the result of the syntagmatic spreading of a value construction.
Contrasting absence with the presence of a marked entity, its value becomes evi-
dent. In this manner, for example, by showing the difficulty, the misery and sorrow
of those who live under foreign rule in the beginning, and showing the satisfaction,
the benefits and happiness of those who enjoy freedom and independence in their
own homeland in the end, one could express a thorough semantic investigation of
the concept of “national independence”, pathemic components included. The nar-
rative results in an exploration of an area of the cultural system.
In the neo-classical semiotic project, aimed at overcoming the traditional sepa-
ration between semiotic research areas, this analytical method represents a pivoting
point, as it allows a decisive structural connection between narrative theory, sign
theory, and the theory of passions. Even the latter, in fact, responds to the same
construction principle. What we call “passion” is the effect of meaning resulting
from the comparison between two alternative states of affairs (the comparison
between the possessing or not possessing a certain thing represents, of course, only
one of many discernable cases). In short, we have at our disposal the first draft of a
basic form that, by developing the Proppian concept of function, brings many key
areas of semiotic theory closer to each other. An essential concept lies at the root:
what appears to have a positive identity should instead be conceived of as a
basically relational structure.
7.3 The Process and the System
This “nuclear” conception of the story, while presenting many interesting aspects, as
we have seen, is an overly simplified schematization. In the context of this article,
centered on the genesis of narrative forms, it should be especially emphasized that a
redefinition of Proppian “functions” in terms of transformative procedures neglects
the important question of the authority to which these regulatory mechanisms refer
(therefore, in Greimasian terms this concerns the role of the Sender, with all its
variants and its rightful extensions2). For example, consider the aforementioned
segment of the Proppian compositional scheme in which the subject of an action finds
themself unable to carry out their narrative plan for lack of knowledge, skills, tools, or
transportation. Citing the transformative process—which will change the relation-
ships between the elements at play, and output a subject prepared to accomplish the
task—is not enough here, we must also specify that this procedure is initiated and
controlled by a defined top-level entity (according to Propp, this corresponds to the
Donor, and for a more elaborate narrative semiotics to the Sender of use values).
This means that the function status is more complex, because it must take into
account both the completed transformation (or the transformation that is planned,
2 See Ferraro (2012).
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expected, and hoped to be realized) and the authority that presides over it as well as
the control logic that it applies. These forces, that design and govern the transfor-
mation procedures, are essential in determining the meaning of the events. That
Romeo and Juliet could shift from being simple lovers to legitimate spouses (Wed-
ding function) is certainly interesting, but it is obvious that the meaning becomes very
different if they marry by choice and without difficulty, if they are forced to do so by
their parents, or if they marry with the complicity of mothers but against the wishes of
their respective clans, and so on. Every solution bears very different meanings,
precisely because each of these possibilities places the transformative action in a
different position within the map provided by the normative framework.
This concern for rules is consistently present in the narrative constructions. Even
if we look only at Propp’s compositional scheme, we can see that the function
couple Prohibition/Infringement is proposed from the very beginning. In as far as
the value assigned to these functions can be significantly variable (the prohibition
may be proposed with correctly protective intent, or conversely as unlawful limi-
tation of the protagonist’s free will), we should still take note that, from the
beginning, a dialectic is proposed between dependence and autonomy, and with this
an unequal condition of knowledge and authority, and an opposition between rules
coming from the outside and the choices made by the protagonist. The first indi-
cation of what we call the “Subject” is presented in terms of an ability to define
routes and plans of action, coming out of a “home” to be understood not only as a
protective family but also as a reference to the systemic dimension of shared norms.
This narrative architecture immediately declares that the subject does not exist if not
through its own distance from the plane of constructed models. This is immediately
seen as an irrational and self-destructive gesture. The story may later lead the
protagonist to a positive redefinition of their identity and their relationship to the
surrounding universe. However, going through the forest despite mother’s prohi-
bition, as happens in many fairy tales, appears at first as silly as Ulysses’ decision to
go and see what there was beyond the pillars of Hercules was traditionally con-
sidered “crazy”.
In more general terms, we can see that much narrative architecture is built on the
correlation of two planes, respectively based on profoundly different logic. One
plane is based on what I call the Perspective Rule, transformative and innovative,
moved by the desire of a Subject that intends to achieve valued goals (typically,
acquire social status). On the other hand there is a Destination Rule, called on to
uphold the syntactic positions that belong to various types of Senders, but which
correspond first of all to a shared plane of norms and patterns. If the first Rule is
activated by the subject’s willingness to change its position in the social system, the
second is instead a systemic tendency towards homeostasis and the reconstitution of
balance. Each of the two planes has its own distinct functional logic and its own
manner of story construction, as well as its own evaluative logic for the assignment
of meaning to things. These evaluation methods have a subjective nature for the
Perspective level and an objective nature for the Destination level. Hence the
definition of two distinct sets of semantic assignments, and the construction of
separate Objects of value. The architecture that best shows this duality is that which
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is based on the Contract, because by definition it implies an exchange of Objects of
value, and on a deeper and interesting level, the possibility for translatability
between objective and subjective values. In this manner, for example, the killing of
a dragon that threatens the community (somatic act on the objective level) can be
translated, on the subjective level, into the decisive transformation of a strictly
personal identity.
Precisely as the contract-based architecture shows us, the two procedural and
systemic narrative levels in fact implicate each other. We see that the social
authority (in the fairy tale, typically, the king) is not able to act on the objective
plane in the absence of a subject who is looking for an identity. On the other hand,
this subject cannot hope to achieve their desired identity until some urgency is
objectively reported. This relationship of implication can be made equally clear
even in a completely different architecture. For example, when the subjective and
private love affair between characters like Romeo and Juliet, otherwise devoid of
particular interest, collides with a conflictually structured social system.
As one can imagine, a significant portion of the meaning in a narrative text (or in
the model that underlies it) lies in the way this fundamental relation is defined,
demonstrating if the subject asserts itself through the observance of the rules, or
conversely rebelling against them. A factor that has decidedly limited, and some-
how diverted the development of narrative theory, is the obsessive reference to an
architecture, such as that of typical Russian fairy tales, that is characterized by a
marked respect for authority, and therefore by a principle in which the definition of
personal identity comes from above, provided through strongly coded elements
(noble status, accentuated levels of wealth, etc.…). In this case a kind of static map
of the world predominates. The subject, even with all of its agency, has no intention
of changing this map. Instead, the subject has every interest in keeping the structure
firm, simply changing its place on the map. The story never questions the grid on
which is drawn, but merely indicates the distance between the starting and ending
position of the subject. The final function that Propp astutely called Wedding (even
without fully grasping its value) is particularly emblematic in this sense. The
Wedding, more than just a positive sanction, overlaps a prize value with the very
interesting concept of a merger. The Subject, initially very far from the heart of the
social mechanism, affirms himself by dissolving into the authority, marrying and
becoming King himself, a guiding principle, foundation of that unalterable world
map on whose entanglements he earlier actively climbed (Fig. 7.1).
7.4 Questioning the Frame of Reference
We need not think about the new world that opens up beyond the Pillars of Her-
cules in order to explore a very different architecture than that which Propp studied.
A mundane transatlantic cruise could illustrate how a modest route can be equally
significant (it is symptomatic that the representation makes use, in any case, of a
spatial distribution). I’m referring to the story told in the film Titanic and to the
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small vertical journey that leads a girl, initially decked in first class with her mother
and future husband, to descend into the far more lively and intriguing third-class
deck, falling into the arms of a romantically creative but penniless passenger. It is
evident here how different the pillars that hold up the narrative architecture are. The
girl is very aware that she is not moving on a static social and categorical map. With
her gesture, she is affirming another way to: read the world; determine the rela-
tionships between the values; conceive individual destiny; evaluate the impact of
the rules. All of this is irreducible to the reading of world from which she comes. In
particular, it becomes clear that individual destiny is no longer the variable element
in a fixed reference system, since what is questioned in the first place is the ref-
erence system itself. In a certain manner, the configuration of the linear develop-
ment does not fundamentally change. The beautiful Rose must still identify the
person with whom she feels an affinity strong enough to impel her to join their life.
The development of events remains substantially the same (the girl does not decide,
say, to give up a betrothal in order to instead enroll in a university course, but rather
inhabits the same type of story with another logic), the difference lies in the shift of
interested values—those that in our metaphorical use of the Cartesian model would
be found on the ordinate axis. The story’s audience clearly perceives that the
change of reference values makes the girl protagonist similar to the romantic artist
in third class, and hopelessly dissimilar to the businessman boyfriend with whom
she otherwise shared the opulent spaces of first class. Maintaining the route taken
by the girl substantially stationary only serves to emphasize the comparison and
difference between the reference systems, and makes it clear that this is precisely
what matters (Fig. 7.2).
Far from being an anomaly, this example indicates how limiting the flattening of
the story to a mere linear process of transformation can be. In fact, quite central is
the relationship that situates the transformative process in the design of the very
space that maps the possibilities, the categorical axes, the reference points, and
ultimately the criteria for creating meaning. The model of the map and route, or in
my terms the intersection between the two fundamental principles of Destination
and Perspective, can be seen at the root of many narrative phenomena, as well as at
the root of ways of building sense in many semiotic systems. I will cite just one
example, whose distance provides an idea of the conceptual model’s range.
According to Byron Almén (2008) music, in its various forms, has a construction
similar to that of the narrative. Each piece of music is based on a tension between
order and chaos. On one hand, it provides a system of tonal and formal rules, but on
the other hand, the composition’s development derives its appeal from the fact that
in some way it seems to question the system itself. The musical phrases, in a certain
sense equipped with a kind of agentive force, present dissonances and irregularities,
delays and detours. These introduce conflict, the possibility to disrupt order, a
virtual effect of chaos. The musical architecture is therefore based on a conflict
between a hierarchy and a transformation principle, whose results may be different
depending on the case. Will the order be maintained in the end, or will new and
unexpected paths open? Will the hierarchical system be upset by the transgressions,
or will a synthesis of initially conflictual components be reached? We are faced,
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once again, with a variant of the model proposed earlier. We can understand that the
confirmations could be multiplied, utilizing reflections from many different semiotic
fields. But at this point it is sufficiently clear in what sense the narrative does not
propose a linear process, but rather a complex and ever-changing relationship
between the dimension of the process and its systemic context, constantly called
into question, or if we prefer, between the journey and the map on which it takes
place. Now we can use a theoretical conception that develops these ideas, reor-
ganizing them in an original and advanced direction.
7.5 The Concept of “Transformation”, from Thompson to
Lévi-Strauss
Claude Lévi-Strauss, one of the most important masters of narrative theory, pro-
posed a very different perspective on the generation of stories from those most
common in semiotics.3 He does not refer to the generation of text from an external
cultural model (as in practice we find in Propp), nor to its generation from a deep
internal core (as in the Greimasian path). His concept is radically structural and
Saussurean. As the Genevan teacher claimed, semiotic objects are presented as a
kind of epiphenomenon that veils their true nature as essentially relational entities.
This principle is applied by Lévi-Strauss both to the specific symbolic components
present in stories and to whole texts and mythological complexes. The concept of
“relational identity” is methodologically rendered through the introduction of a
completely new notion of “transformation”.
In this perspective, the narrative heritage of a culture is no longer thought of as a
set of stationary and closed objects, with independent and internally defined identity
(that which we usually call “texts”), but rather appears in the form of an uninter-
rupted flow of ordered operations, those for which we would now use the term
practices. These continually reinterpret and rewrite the myths, so that it is never
possible to identify an “original” or “definitive” text. Each story is nothing but the
coagulation of a transient state of the symbolic system. On the other hand, the
system only manifests itself through its precarious projection onto a series of texts.
If what matters the most in every story is the differential range that defines and
identifies it, the “structure” does not seem as important as its transformative
capacity. In this view, the texts acquire meaning through the interweaving of their
mutual references, by playing with analogy and reversal, in a fascinating mecha-
nism of incorporation and endless remaking. Every text, one can say, exists only
through other texts. Every myth is by nature a translation, deriving its origin from
another myth in a neighboring but foreign population, or from a myth in the same
population, temporally earlier or contemporary, or perhaps belonging to another
social division. Far from being mere formal operations, these practices visualize the
3 For an overall reappraisal of Levi-Strauss’ narratological theory, see Ferraro (2001).
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signs of tensions that, even in the simplest ethnological realities (we will shortly see
an example), create conflict between social forces, cultural models or ethnic groups.
This demonstrates how Lévi-Straussian theory offers valuable elements for those
who intend to propose seriously socio-semiotic perspectives.
Lévi-Strauss needed a “transformation” concept that involved more than the
comparison and analysis of textual divergences, beyond the line of succession or
the diachronic dimension. The “transformations” to which he refers do not lie
between a “before” and “after”, but rather between the one and the other’s systemic
contexts. He found the most appropriate theoretical model to build on in the famous
book on the morphogenesis of zoological species, On Growth and Form, by D’Arcy
Wentworth Thompson (1952). From this book, great in every sense (the first edition
is 793 pages, 1116 the second), Lévi-Strauss essentially used the chapter on the
Theory of transformations, which is also the best-known part in general.
Thompson’s basic idea is that—in the study of the morphology of an animal
species, in his case—we should take greater account of the integrity of the whole,
instead of examining the parts as if they were independent components, a live body
is indivisible. The goal, therefore, is to render scientifically evident the way in
which living forms are related to one another as a whole, considering the observable
differences between related species not in terms of a sum of individual modifica-
tions but as a process that informs the integral unit. For us, the decisive points are
twofold: that the differences between entities of any type can in fact be expressed in
a unified form, as the result of a single overall transformation which gives rise to a
whole set of related changes; and that these processes entail the action of defined
dynamic forces. Let us add that these “transformations”, according to Thompson,
are not temporally oriented. In other words, they do not imply that a species is
descended from another, or that one species is the result of a Darwinian modifi-
cation of another. The transformative is by principle a reciprocal relationship, which
can be thought of in one direction as much as in the opposite one. Lévi-Strauss uses
precisely these concepts, but also ideally incorporates the use that Thompson had
made of topological models. In order to create a visible and precise representation
of his way of thinking, he proposed that the relations between similar species could
usefully be displayed on a Cartesian coordinate system. Here you find, in fact, the
more evident passage from the concept of a set of biological components to a
properly systemic entity. Thompson shows (see the examples shown in Fig. 7.3)
how the differences that seem ambiguous and complex can be instead referenced to
simple phenomena, assuming you shift the focus from the objects to the coordinate
system in which they are placed, and from which they are (mathematically, in this
case) defined. The deformation of the coordinate system explains the consequent
alteration of what is inscribed, so that a series of changes that we would have first
identified at the level of the specific components becomes, in fact, aspects of a
single overall transformation.
Whatever value that Thompson’s theory still has in the biology, I think we can
say that the re-use of these concepts in the human sciences could have an even
greater scope and significance. Topological models developed in mathematics come
to anthropological studies, semiotics and the theory of narrative, through the helpful
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filter of biology. Worth thinking about, in any case, is the fact that Thompson’s
conceptual innovation received much attention in the field of biological sciences,
while it has gone largely unnoticed, and therefore unused in the field of semiotic
research (perhaps more short-sighted, tending to be more dogmatic). The idea that
the differences between observable objects (that is, in our case, between texts) can
be much better defined and explained by returning them to the differences between
the reference systems, is of fundamental interest, even if in this case we mean
semiotic systems, not subject to mathematical descriptions and only metaphorically
close to Cartesian systems.
Even here, the differences between the stories are interpreted as effects of the
transformation of the containing field, or as a passage of the textual object through
different containing fields, as we will see shortly in some examples. We must also
stress in this respect (even though we cannot further develop this discourse here),
that the shift of attention from objects to the system in which they exist also
corresponds to a reintroduction of a Saussurean vision (accent on system rather than
on the textual product) in a more effective and mature manner than either the
excessively simple original, or the equally excessive shift to textual perspectives.
The conceptual distinction between the coordinate system and the path that is
inscribed inside it remains decisive, even if abstracted from its mathematical ref-
erence, confirming in another way the presence of two basic components: a gen-
erally static regulatory level and a dynamic and transformative procedural level.
It goes without saying that a story can hardly be represented in the form of
Cartesian graph. Lévi-Strauss’ typical use is rather that of textual tables, presenting
what he calls “transformation groups”, visualizing the links between stories that are
in some way related, and often describing many differences as due to the effects of a
primary transformation. We can therefore read the differences between mythical
tales, for example belonging to two neighboring ethnic groups, not in terms of
Fig. 7.3 A typical example from D.W. Thompson’s On Growth and Form, p. 1063
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differences in those two particular stories, but as traces of the transformational
relationship that binds the two mythological systems. If one myth seems somehow
to deform another, the deformation can be attributed to the underlying semiotic
fields. The “semiotic fields” that I am referring to are not, of course, abstract entities
of logical nature but socio-cultural realities, that correspond to alternative ways of
viewing the world, symbolic systems in conflict with one another, behind which we
can see the presence of ideologically antagonistic power centers. As in the case of
Thompson’s animal species, we can also explain the form taken by the stories as
dependant on the action of dynamic factors, almost the hint of a diagram of forces.
There is no need to emphasize that textual theory emerges greatly innovated, or
that this perspective seems particularly pertinent precisely in that it no longer
conceives of the cultural system as a sort of collection of statically and individually
defined texts, but as a network of connected texts and textual portions. In this
different perspective the generation of the texts is transversal, implemented by
deformation and comparison, reaction and opposition. Since all textual content is
related to relational reading, the difference, which in Propp’s model (and partly in
that of Greimas) separates the formal or syntactic level from the content or variable
components level, disappears. The formal dimension, rethought in terms of a
relational plan and an active process, invests all levels and components in the same
way. Nothing escapes.
7.6 Narratives in Conflict
Unfortunately, Lévi-Strauss, despite having left us many suggestions and direc-
tions, did not leave us a systematic analysis to satisfactorily illustrate these con-
cepts. This was also due to his method, characterized by a strong centrifugal
development, which led him to explore an increasingly wider set of texts and
cultures. Personally, I have conducted a test study on one of the specific cultures
and specific delimited mythological complexes studied by Lévi-Strauss, and at this
point I find it useful to make a very briefly reference to this research,4 so as to not
leave the reader lost in the generality of abstract concepts and models. The fact that
we are addressing the Bororo myths, including the myth from which the grand
construction of Mythologiques starts (the myths considered correspond to, in Lévi-
Straussian numbering, M1, M2 and M5),
5 is superficially interesting. The fact that in
this case there is a conflict between different symbolic systems that oppose each
other within the same community is more relevant. We think of this kind of phe-
nomenon as belonging to complex societies, but it can also be present in societies
4 The study is included in the second chapter of the third part of the Ferraro (2001) volume. In that
research I resumed a part of Lévi-Strauss’ analytic material, uniting it with ethnographic
information from other sources.
5 The analysis of these myths lies in the first chapters of Lévi-Strauss (1964).
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we consider “simple”. Indeed, it is significant that the same missionaries who had
contact with this population were puzzled by the contradictions that they encoun-
tered in indigenous beliefs, particularly with regard to the explanation of disease
causes (as well as that of the origin of storms, which we will discuss in a little bit).
Antonio Colbacchini (1925) suggests that there was in fact an overlap between an
original belief system and another set of substantially foreign beliefs (and, it should
be pointed out, institutions), probably imported from another tribe. We can there-
fore assume that we are faced with two different systems of semiotic coordinates in
which stories are inserted that together make up the narrative heritage of a defined
population. Even more interesting, however, is another consideration. The two
symbolic and narrative systems that come into clear conflict in the Bororo myth-
ological universe, despite sharing much textual construction material, reveal a
profoundly, constitutively different nature.
Let’s center our attention on the question of causes of disease. Two myths in
particular belong to what we recognize as the first of the two conflictual semiotic
fields, one centered on the origin of watercourses, the other on the origin of dis-
eases. These stories talk about mythical times characterized by a total absence of
order, and later about the establishment of some kind of order, universal, cosmo-
logical, ethical and social at the same time. The era of the disorder is marked by
incest, greedy people who do not share food with others, and by the absence of
those waterways that organize the material and symbolic geography of the territory,
and by the correlative absence of funeral rites, resulting in the reprehensible practice
of keeping the bodies in pits dug under the huts. The creation of the waterways and
the parallel establishment of burial rituals (in the water of the rivers, in fact)
intervene to bring an order which is then supplemented by the establishment of a
separate and corresponding kingdom of the dead. This kingdom will be entrusted to
two village leaders belonging to one of the two social halves that compose the
Bororo society, while the world of the living will be ruled by two village leaders
belonging to the opposite social half. As you can see, the game of symbolic
symmetries can skillfully cover what we would consider the givens of an asym-
metry of power. As for the origin of the disease, this is presented as a result of
antisocial behavior. A woman, after having caught a lot of fish, ate them imme-
diately rather than sharing it with relatives. Her belly swells as a result, and when
the woman returns to the village her body gives birth to every kind of disease.
These references bring us back to an obviously broader and very well organized
system, with distinctions and symmetries, exchanges and reciprocal duties, lines of
separation and regulated transition processes. Its hold on reality depends also on the
ability to enclose the entire universe in a global model, including spiritual com-
ponents. In fact the symmetrical relationship between world of the dead village
leaders and world of the living village leaders is very significant, as well as the
latter’s task to hold dance rituals in which they symbolically embody the dead.
Symmetrically, even here, deceased members are impersonated from members of
the opposite social half. The rules of incest are just as much part of this overall
conception of the ordering of the real (forbidden to have any proximity with
someone of your own social half), as is the explanation of the disease, seen as a
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consequence of the breakdown of the mechanisms of mutual exchange that this
worldview is based on.
To provide an idea of the syntagmatic arrangement of events, the myth of
Baitogogo (M2) describes how in ancient times there was a boy who had reached
the age of initiation, but did not want to leave his mother. One day he secretly
follows her in the forest, where he sees his incestuous betrayal with a man
belonging to his own social half. The father kills his wife and rival and buries them
in a pit dug under the hut. The child turns into a bird and inseminates a rapidly
growing tree on his father’s shoulder (notice this irruption of the vertical dimension,
that appears hostile and a little out of place in this story). The man runs away from
the village, and the tree is transformed, giving rise gradually to waterways. In this
watery world, he founds the happy kingdom of the souls of the dead and creates the
necessary ritual tools for funeral rites.
Other stories refer to a different perspective. What is known as the myth of
Geriguiguiatugo on the origin of storms opens with a young man who, at the
moment he was about to be initiated, follows his mother into the forest and rapes her.
The boy’s father (who is one of the two village leaders) seeks to cause the boy’s
death in various ways, but the boy escapes all trials. From the beginning, the stories
seem to speak to each other from a distance, as if resuming and disproving the
content of the other. For example, this is true for the symbolic element of water,
which we saw occupy a fundamental place in the founding support of universal order
in the stories of the first group. Our Geriguiguiatugo is instead immune to water,
thanks to the support of birds or the ability to transform himself into a bird (just like
the son of Baitogogo in the other story). But the ability to transform himself into a
bird seems like a first reference to another social institution, that of the fearsome
Bororo sorcerers, the Bari. And on this road we can come to understand that this
story, in opposition to the previous ones, is supporting an alternative world view, in
which the social order (symbolized by the rule of incest and placed on a substantially
horizontal plane) is not only markedly diminished but particularly dissociated from
the cosmological order and the vertical dimension, called on to connect the world of
men to that of the spirits. In this second vision, for example, both storms and diseases
are sent by spirits of dead sorcerers (who dominate the world above), as punishment
for lack of respect, and therefore have no connection with issues of anti-social
behavior. The end of this myth recounts, not by accident, how a storm puts out the
village fires. Then the young Geriguiguiatugo, transformed into a deer, attacks his
father and kills him. The story ends in this manner with the killing of the village
headman, highest chief of the social order, by a stag, the animal in which it is
believed that the dead sorcerers reincarnate. In addition, we find the establishment of
the avenging power of the storms: two clear references to the sinister power of the
Bari. The stance taken by this tale is therefore unquestionable.
The outline of each story, however, seems to take on real meaning only if it is
seen as a polemic transformation of other stories. Even though we can not go into
details, it should be emphasized that, if the myth of Geriguiguiatugo “is subjected
to” the conceptual structure of the adversary’s mythology and builds upon it, this is
also true for the Baitogogo myth, that must create a place for a unique bird that
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seems to appear as a sort of citation of the opposing story. We can speculate, in
effect, that the comprehension of these stories requires the listeners to mentally
compare the corresponding textual structures. In a sort of battle for the ownership of
the traditional mythological nucleus, each party tries to include the opponent’s
themes and narrative configurations, so that both the “chief’s” and the “sorcerer’s”
mythologies seem to reproduce common patterns, distorted and reorganized in
order to respond to the symbolic coordinates that define the two antagonistic
semiotic fields.
In essence, the “chief’s” mythology outlines the logic of a world founded on a
pervasive symmetry, a symmetry that is actually easy for the natives to find in their
experience, starting with the fact that the social universe is clearly regulated by the
symmetry between the two halves of which it is composed. How this reciprocity
extends also to the metaphysical relationship between the living and the dead is
rendered palpable by the participation in ritual dances, in which each person plays a
deceased person from the opposite half. On the contrary, the system of stories and
beliefs that support the power of the sorcerers is characterized by a strong asym-
metry and by the decisive, terrifying controlling power that the spirits exert over the
natives, and in particular on their health. The preeminence of the vertical dimension
(from which the destructive water of the storms comes) is highlighted, together with
a subjective and individual dimension. It is a distressing world, marked by an
intersection of premonitory and expiatory tensions.
The conflict between the two different codifications of the world is in our eyes
even more interesting because it confronts two very different narrative construction
logics. The first follows modes typical of a pre-literate mythology, based on a play of
analogical correspondences between the different aspects and levels of reality. The
personal stories have a very limited perspective dimension. What matters is the
perfect logical hold of the map, that the events placed “in mythical time” serve only
to establish, consolidate and stabilize. Errors and shortcomings directly correspond
to that which could unravel the system: leaving ones appointed position; not
respecting symmetries and reciprocity. The regular systemic grid is exactly what
must be safeguarded. The other rationale is presented as instead based primarily on a
rift that distinguishes this all-encompassing grid into two distinct areas: the hori-
zontal order of the social universe, acknowledged but delimited; and a more decisive
order, vertical and supernatural, which plays on emotions and subjective plans,
where the principle of reciprocity turns into revenge, error into sin. The harmonious,
static games of multiple analogical correspondences typical of the myth, concede the
field to narrative settings closer to those that we are more familiar with.
The study of the reciprocal transformational relationship between the stories
included in the two respective semiotic fields is therefore doubly interesting,
because in addition to showing how the myths (somehow like Thompson’s famous
fish) change their form, passing from one frame of reference to another, it also helps
us observe the transition between two different modes of narrative construction. In
as much as we can see in these allusions, the first mode, decidedly situated on the
map, bets everything on the strength of the order of its own coordinate system,
trying to avoid events that will disturb its regularity. The second argues instead that
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the orders are numerous and hard to decipher, and that life is a journey, a set of
actions that can be right or wrong, each of which involves consequences. The
process, we would say, dominates the map. But the natives, to whom in all like-
lihood the relationship between the two systems in conflict is not so obvious,
continue to repeat stories that seem to objectively resume, replicate content, vary
episodes, as in a game of mirrors to which one can superficially assign a only
formal value.
7.7 Aliens and Bohemians
Levi-Strauss’ theory was not developed through the study of oral narrative texts by
chance, where the continuous modification of the stories is of course facilitated by
the absence of a written reference version. This does not mean, however, that it is not
applicable to stories from our recent culture. In a recent research project (Ferraro and
Brugo (2008), for example, I investigated the evolution (from the late nineteenth
century to the beginning of this century) of stories and figures that were called on to
symbolize absolute evil, such as vampires, monsters or aliens. In fact, it was possible
to identify a coherent and potentially global variation logic, exactly as if the overall
deformation of the cultural coordinate system had determined the parallel transfor-
mation of the stories, even in cases where the authors were sincerely convinced of
repeating them without changing anything. This alteration, to give you an idea, is
related primarily to the development that starts from the collocation of evil in an
impersonal and external place, leading to the belief that we ourselves create our own
monsters, indicating a relationship that is no longer separate but involved.
For example, if we consider the four films in the Alien series, directed by four
different and important directors from 1979 to 1997, we find that the same story was
basically told four times, changing gradually in relation to the cultural system in
which it was inscribed. This phenomenon is conceptually very close to the most
crucial aspects of the theory of transformations presented by Thompson in Growth
and Form. Even though the four episodes of the saga maintain a consistent,
common ideological position—a basic anti-establishment, anti-religious, and in its
own way anti-capitalist attitude, hostile to any combination of scientific and
commercial interests—an evolution occurs, which in some respects leads to a true
reversal of the original symbolic structures. The relationships between these texts
could indeed fit very well into transformational schemes used by Lévi-Strauss. This
could include the figure of the alien. In the first film, the monster penetrates the
human being in a sort of gruesome sexual act, reducing it from subject to a mere
object, a mere instrument for its reproduction. In the end, changing gender and role,
yet with an absolutely compelling transformative logic, the alien appears as the
daughter generated by the protagonist. And this one, the protagonist of the story, is
defined from the start as an object, who only in retrospect can access human status.
If we look carefully, we notice that it all depends on a shift of the plane of
meaning. The placement of the ‘evil’ that we addressed earlier essentially changes,
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and with it the conception of causal agency. There are no passive victims, but
entities that are architects of their own condition. Once this is understood, it
becomes clear that all of the transformations are clearly systemic, starting with the
one that, while maintaining the reproduction of aliens through human beings as a
fixed process, shifts the focus of attention from fertilization (passive, for the human
being) to generation (active). There is a polarity change from male to female, which
also corresponds, on the negative side, to the name change of the oppressive
controller computer system from Mother to Father. Following this logic, we find a
shift from the natural to the artificially built, from an identity given at birth to an
identity actively acquired, from a negative to a positive perception of hybrid human/
non-human entities. We shift from fear of the alien to fear of the human, from a
simple and integral dread to an anxiety mixed with compassion and tenderness. We
abandon the idea of a return to a “home”, understood as the comfortable world that
we came from, for the arrival in a world that seems both our “own” and unknown,
projected into a still unreadable future… We find ourselves in front of the trans-
formation tables that fill the pages of Lévi-Strauss’ research on American
mythologies. The narrated story repeats an almost obsessive formula, rewarding the
viewer with the pleasure of repeatedly experiencing the same adventure. Yet the
meaning of the story undergoes a sharp twist, as a result of changes in the con-
taining framework, due to a sort of contraction that folds the external pole back on
the internal one. This story, which had an important place in the collective imag-
ination of the time, in short, gives us a clear example of the way in which textual
forms undergo changes that can only be understood if seen as effects of a single
comprehensive transformation, giving rise to a whole set of related changes.
Moreover, this comprehensive transformation is in itself well explained as depen-
dant on the action of defined cultural dynamics. What was difficult to grasp through
the use of traditional generative semiotic methods, seems rather clear in the light of
a theoretical model with a transformational and systemic approach.
I would like to close these reflections, however, by citing a case that is even
more particular and intriguing, for our theoretical speculations.6 At the decisive
moment of the transition from a somewhat tired nineteenth century to the trium-
phant modernity of the twentieth century (in 1896), an artist who was curious about
everything new, open to international culture but at the same time undoubtedly
linked to the romantic tradition, Giacomo Puccini, created La Bohème, which
appears as both one thing and its opposite. The story is old and well known, coming
from a successful comedy 50 years earlier. It speaks of a world, people and times
long past, while resuming a model that is the epitome of a certain kind of stories. In
fact it draws inspiration from the inexorably moving archetype, the literary femme
fragile: pale and sickly, linked to cold and the moon, related to flowers and
obviously ephemeral, Mimì is destined to unrelenting agony. The story, thanks to
its setting in a bohemian attic where four young artists live, has all the necessary
requirements to represent the triumph of romanticism. And yet, when it was
6 Reiterating briefly the findings of a larger study, cfr. Ferraro (2009).
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presented, many perceived it as exactly the opposite: an astonishing break with
romantic opera traditions, an unprecedented concession to the new revolutionary
style of realism at all costs. The judgments of the time are striking: for some the
story is cloying like the music that accompanies it; for others it is a miracle of fine
complexity; for some it is a backward and trite melodrama; for others still it is
surprisingly sophisticated and innovative. It cannot even be said that the judgments
of a certain kind can be attributed to conservative critics and others to liberals,
because the opinions are mixed in a quite symptomatic confusion.
Puccini developed the story with the two authors of the text, who, not surpris-
ingly, were also twofold in nature. One, Giuseppe Giacosa, was a classic and
elegant man of letters, while Luigi Illica was an irregular and innovative poet. The
story was created through endless bickering and negotiation, cut through with
ellipses, narrowed to four flashes isolated in time. Therefore the story ends up
perfectly ambiguous, and the figure of the protagonist is permanently unreadable.
On the one hand, the work stands as a text that is properly inscribed in nineteenth-
century culture, but on the other, it is also readable as a venomous parody that takes
distance from nineteenth-century culture, fully set in twentieth-century models. In
this case, we can truly say that the text exists essentially as a remake, as a citation
of a way of feeling and as a transformation of other texts, which at the same time
re-plays and rejects, perpetually suspended between moving sentiments and cyni-
cism. Do the two protagonists really live a touching love story, cut short by an
incurable disease? Is Rodolfo really a talented undiscovered writer, taken by his
own poetic inspiration? Or are they instead two seedy characters? Could it not be
that Rodolfo is a mediocre, unreliable, and distracted man; unable to care for the
woman he claims to love, aware of his own literary failure, parked in an attic while
he awaits an inheritance from his rich sick uncle? Couldn’t Mimì be a frivolous girl,
ready to crawl into bed with an old and wealthy man, in order to leave the miserable
attic to which she returns only when she is already dying? The two truths, with the
two opposing identities of the protagonists, are both present. The spirit of the past
and the spirit of the future share the same spaces and the same gestures, even the
music is both moving and anti-naturalistic. The viewer can perceive everything as
terribly trite, or as surprisingly new and alienating. Puccini created, in essence, a
kind of meta-text, built on “romantic” stories and ways of feeling. Properly, neither
the old world of bohemian attics nor the new world that should replace it is
represented. More precisely, the passage from one to the other is staged, seizing the
moment in which the one is still present and the other is not yet fully established.
What in short is shown is the change as such, the jump that leads from a cultural
system to another, as well as the problem of mutual illegibility that this entails.
It is evident, I think, the pertinence of this example to our discussion. The fact is
that the transformational relationship between one fish and another does not pose
cultural problems, but things are very different when we talk about the passage of
stories from one semio-cultural system to another. Bohème is, of course, a partic-
ularly fascinating case, but far from extraordinary. Indeed, the most interesting
aspect of using Thompson’s model in a narratological context, is perhaps that of
focusing attention on those texts that, rather than definitely belong to one or another
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system, pose themselves crosswise so to speak, simultaneously settled in multiple
reference systems. They present themselves, of course, as complete and defined
entities and are therefore perceived as individual objects, but in fact possess mul-
tiple identities, dependent on the different reference systems in which they are
inscribed. The use of Thompson’s model allows us to imagine fascinating exten-
sions of semiotic methodology, helping us intuit how the study of relationships
between systems could be more effective and valuable than an analysis of objects
conceived as such. We can pay the price of giving up objective and immanent
definitions of textual constructs, in order to better understand the dynamics of
change and the interaction of the systems of semiotic coordinates that ultimately
define their meaning.
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